Open for Business: Migrant Entrepreneurship in OECD Countries (EMPLOI ET LE MA)
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This paper examines how the increase in under-employment since the financial crisis stems from both cyclical and structural factors, notably the gradual shift of employment toward more demand-driven service sectors. The increase in under-employment Looking at secondary schools, this paper analyses work-based learning WBL as an element of both general education and vocational programmes.
The workplace is a powerful learning environment where technical skills can be learnt from expert Labour markets across the OECD have polarised in recent decades, as the share of middle skill occupations has declined relative to that of both high- and low skill occupations. This paper shows that, contrary to what is often assumed in the public This study aims at disentangling the returns to formal, non-formal and informal training and fills key knowledge gaps. Informal learning is found to be by far the most common form of job-related learning at work. Learning informally at work is found This report asks what is happening to middle-skill workers.
Driven by mega trends such as automation, ageing and offshoring, the share of jobs whose wages placed them firmly in the middle of the wage distribution has been declining. Termed job This paper introduces a new set of indicators aimed at benchmarking how OECD countries fare in attracting talented migrants. Three different profiles of talent are considered: workers with graduate master or doctorate degrees, entrepreneurs, and Routine-biased technological change has emerged as a leading explanation for the differential wage growth of routine occupations, such as manufacturers or office clerks, relative to less routine occupations.
Less clear, however, is how the effects of This paper provides an overview of the analytical work carried out in the context This paper studies the effects of a voluntary skill certification scheme in an online freelancing labour market. This effect is not driven by increased worker Profiling tools help to deliver employment services more efficiently. They can ensure that more costly, intensive services are targeted at jobseekers most at risk of becoming long term unemployed.
Moreover, the detailed information on the employment How do firm-level collective agreements affect firm performance in a multi-level bargaining system? Using detailed Belgian linked employer-employee panel data, our findings show that firm agreements increase both wage costs and labour productivity Nordic countries such as Sweden, Norway and Finland have been consistently the most favourable to immigration while eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic and Hungary have been the least favourable.
Despite their relatively high The nature, content and milieu of work — i. There is a great deal of evidence to show clear associations between job quality and the health of This paper compares the situation of children in Canada relative to other OECD countries in terms of child poverty and well-being. First, trends in child poverty and living standards since , i.
Others were transnational entrepreneurs assisting Dutch businesses in their country of origin. The importance of business experience is illustrated by the case of an Iranian trader in medical appliances. She obtained a PhD in the Netherlands and developed medical instruments, a typical university spinoff that would fit well under the startup scheme, which was not in force when she applied.
Her lack of experience as an entrepreneur was held against her until one and a half years had passed and her client base and turnover had increased. The PBS also weights the added value to the Dutch economy: the innovative character of the activities e. Jobs created elsewhere in the EU are not considered, which could be something for EU policy makers to pick up on.
Migrant economies: opportunity structures and potential in different city types
But a high score on added value is no guarantee for a residence permit. This example also explains why so many other applicants do not make their intended investments while awaiting the outcome of their application. But without making the investments they do not get any points in this category. A catch situation that sits bad with legal certainty and is not very welcoming.
The residence permit for a startup is granted for one year and can be extended easily if the facilitator still vouches for the startup.
The residence permit for an entrepreneur is valid for two years and can be extended if the business is doing well enough. Unlike Germany, the Netherlands does not offer talented migrants accelerated access into permanent residence meaning they have to wait five years before being eligible for permanent residence. Interestingly, Dutch immigration policy does allow for hybridization: highly skilled migrant employees such as Blue Card holders may develop business activities on the side, for instance in preparation of a business spin-off.
On the formal criteria it is relevant to note that the application for a startup visa does not require an entry clearance visa if the conditions for entry are met. Applicants for a residence permit as entrepreneur do require an entry clearance visa before coming to the Netherlands unless this requirement is waived due the applicants nationality or previous legal residence.
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Those who need the entry clearance visa are at a disadvantage. They must await the outcome of their application abroad, although short visits on the basis of a business visa might be permitted.
Those who are in the Netherlands awaiting the outcome may begin doing business which will increase their chances of a successful application as for them it is easier to participate in local networks and fulfil the evidentiary requirements. It can be rather lengthy procedures, easily running up to six months. A trader in Dutch scrap metal wanted to export this for processing to Dubai. His business plan looked solid and the municipal Rotterdam Investment Agency assisted in his search for office space.
He required an entry clearance visa but he did not apply for it as required. He kept traveling on temporary Schengen visas granted by other EU countries. In the end, the authorities, both local and national, dropped their support for him and the application was denied on procedural grounds. Some of these practical issues have been dealt with since by improving the relevant websites and opening up direct communication between Economic Affairs and the applicant.
Several institutional and private actors play a relevant role in the admission of immigrant entrepreneurs in the Netherlands. Cities can be recognized as facilitator of a startup or can assist in practical assistance when an entrepreneur is searching for a good location. Local or regional government are not involved in the decision-making process, nor are Chambers of Commerce or professional organizations.
Economic Affairs and the Immigration authorities decide together and the better their cooperation, the lower the administrative obstacles. Private actors vouching for the immigrant entrepreneurs can be facilitators of startups and as such have an important say in the entry of new immigrant entrepreneurs.
Banks can have an important say if the offer a loan to the immigrant entrepreneur. Here future EU policy could be of relevance, as currently the Netherlands only accepts a bank with its headquarters in the Netherlands.
To conclude, over the past years the Netherlands has worked hard to make its admission policies for immigrant entrepreneurs more welcoming. The numbers of admitted entrepreneurs has increased. Yet little is known about the long-term residence, success and economic impact of these entrepreneurs. Clearly, the admission policies for entrepreneurs target different types of entrepreneurs. We have seen solo self-employed, entrepreneurs providing jobs, startups, freelancing in all kinds of professions, including the arts, investors.
Entrepreneurship literature shows us many more categorizations of entrepreneurs Wright, Member States shall, as of 23 May , offer TCN who completed their studies or research projects in an EU Member State, a residence permit for at least nine months to set up a business or seek employment. Member States may set a minimum level of the degree obtained, which minimum may be at a highly specialized level. Also, they may require that the business the researcher or student is setting up corresponds to the research or studies completed.
France and Germany included this last requirement explicitly in their policy. If the student is selected by one of the Dutch startup facilitators or enters the French Tech Ticket program, such criteria are no longer blocking their way. Given the fact that many facilitators for startups in the Netherlands are university based, the Dutch startup scheme can be expected to facilitate university spinoffs.
Data on how many of the admitted entrepreneurs previously had a residence permit under another scheme is lacking: only Germany provides such data. The impression is that this is indeed a popular migration trajectory, although the absolute numbers are low. Because retaining foreign students and researchers is an EU policy goal the available policy instruments require fine tuning to further this aim. The higher the required investment or number of jobs, the less welcoming the entry policy is, making the Dutch PBS more welcoming as it allows for compensation in other fields if no jobs are created at all or if the investment is rather low.
Job creation elsewhere in the EU has been disregarded in a Dutch application. From an EU perspective this could be an interesting element to give some weight. Germany replaced the criteria based on jobs and investments by a consultation procedure and France shifted away from these criteria by opening up many other entry categories.
Self-employed professionals are a specific legal category in France and Germany. In general, the PBS seems to allow for more flexibility than the German or French system, but the new French scheme is expected to be more open than their previous investor scheme. The French Tech ticket is more welcoming than the Dutch startup scheme in respect of the funding provided, but because of that, the numbers are limited.
France defines innovative in relation to the tech sector while the Netherlands allows for a broader definition, including innovations in logistics and agriculture. The wider definition of what qualifies as innovative is obviously more welcoming. The scrutinized policies seem to care only indirectly about the immigrants social and family networks, which are not listed as requirements or positive assets.
On the contrary: the Dutch facilitator to a startup may not even be a family member. The scrutinized policies neither explicitly acknowledged gendered life course differences, relevant when selecting female talent Boucher, , meaning these policies can be less welcoming for women.
These are elements future immigration policies could consider more. The welcoming model also mentions the conditions for extension of a residence permit. After five years in France and the Netherlands, the entrepreneur may apply for the long-term residence permit, while Germany may grant a permanent residence permit after three years.
This means that an entrepreneur who makes it past the first three years in Germany is less likely to be forced to leave Germany, while entrepreneurs in the Netherlands and France need to keep their business running for at least five years to obtain a more secure residence status. Literature on startups generally accepts that if a business survives three years, it is a viable business. It would thus make sense to grant a more secure migration status after three years. The formal criteria relate to national administrative law procedures.
Fees differ greatly, with the Dutch fees obviously being the highest. The proportionality of the fees for the startup facilitator — a service provider of sorts — may be contested under EU Services Directive.
The fees in Germany and France seem reasonable. The duration of procedures does not differ greatly although regional differences, especially in France and Germany with decentralized authorities, might occur. A lengthy procedure means loss of time and uncertainty on whether to start investing yes or know. Money invested might be lost if the residence permit is not granted in the end. The costs of an administrative appeal in Germany are significant, which could detract from the welcoming nature of the policies, which include access to legal protection.
The schemes discussed seem relatively straight forward, but each seems to have many detailed evidentiary requirements. In both France and Germany regional governments play a role of importance in the selection process. The French prefecture was permitted to waive the required investment or number of jobs. The role of the prefecture in the new Talent Pass legislation seems less prominent. The German laws refer explicitly to the need to consult non governmental bodies to advice the immigration authorities.